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December 1997 Abstract 
Included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1993 was a provision that 
improved the priority of  depositors and thus of  the FDIC in the event of  a depository 
institution's failure. While intended to reduce the FDIC's cost of  resolving commercial 
bank failures, this provision might have induced general creditors to react so as to offset 
the intended benefit. Depositor preference legislation (DPL) might also have affected 
the FDIC's choice of resolution type. 
Here we examine the empirical impact of DPL on resolution -type  and on 
resolution costs for commercial banks. Given the short time period since the passage of 
national DPL in 1993, we focus  on the impact of state DPL statutes, utilizing call-report 
data and FDIC data on resolution costs and resolution types for all operating FDIC-BIF 
insured commercial banks that were closed or required FDIC financial assistance from 
January 1986 through December 1992. We improve on previous studies by controlling 
for the endogeneity of 'book capital and by adjusting for the sample selection bias 
induced by regulatory closure rules. 
We find that DPL has 1) tended to increase, rather than reduce, FDIC resolution 
costs and 2) induced the FDIC to choose assisted mergers over liquidations. However, 
the source of  the higher resolution costs is unclear and there is no evidence that general 
creditors reacted by increasing collateralization. On August 10,1993 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993. Contained in this legislation was a provision that revised the priority of  claims on 
failed depository institutions  by making other senior claimants junior to depositors. 
Congress apparently hoped to reduce Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
losses by thus changing the capital structure of banks to enhance the priority of 
depositors and thus of  the FDIC. 
Unlike subordinated debenture holders, however, general creditors of 
depository institutions can restructure their claims to effectively make them senior to 
depositors. For example, in response to the implementation of  depositor preference 
laws (DPLs) a general creditor might collateralize her claim. Alternatively, she could 
shorten the maturity of  her claim to increase the probability she could exit before the 
bank is closed. While there have been theoretical analyses of  how DPL should affect the 
values of  various bank claimants, there have been no empirical analyses of  whether or 
not the FDIC's losses have been reduced, or whether general creditors have responded 
so as to offset the intended benefits to the FDIC.' 
Although little time has passed since the passage of  the 1993 legislation some 
individual states already had DPL in effect. In this paper, we examine the impact on 
FDIC resolution costs of  such state legislation from 1984-1992, extending the empirical 
analyses of  closed-bank resolution cost models by James (1991), Osterberg and 
Thomson (1995) (henceforth, OT), and Osterberg (1996). The theoretical framework 
follows Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) and Osterberg and Thomson (1994), where DPL 
reduces the value of  the FDIC claim unless general creditors undertake some offsetting 
a~tion.~  We also test the hypothesis advanced by some analysts that DPL might 
influence the FDIC's choice of resolution type, control for the endogeneity of  book 
measures of bank capital, and  correct for sample selection bias introduced by 
regulatory closure rules. 
See Thomson (1994) for an example of  how FDIC  losses may increase as a result of depositor preference 
laws. The remainder of  the paper is as follows. Section I outlines the depositor 
preference legislation and the FDIC's implementation of  it. Section 11 reviews the 
existing literature. The data and the empirical method are presented in III. Our results 
and conclusions are appear in sections IV  and V respectively. 
I.  The Legislative Provisions 
Title III of  the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1993 instituted depositor 
preference for all insured depository institutions by amending Section ll(d)(ll)  of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act [12 U.S.C.  1821(d)(11)].3  The amendment 
establishes the following priority of  payment in the resolution of  a failed depository 
institution: 
(1) Administrative expenses of  the receiver. 
(2) Deposit liabilities. 
(3) General or senior liabilities. 
(4) Subordinated obligations. 
(5) Shareholder claims. 
Prior to DPL, general or other senior liabilities had the same priority of  payment as 
deposits. However, regardless of  the presence of  depositor preference, secured 
creditors of  the failed depository will have their claims satisfied first, up to the amount 
of  the collateral. This implies that general or senior creditors could protect their claim 
by responding to the passage of  DPL by increasing collateral. 
Clearly, the value of  deposit liabilities and claims lower in the pecking order 
depends on the interpretation of  "administrative expenses of  the receiver." On August 
13,1993 the FDIC issued an interim rule which clarified its interpretation of  these 
expenses, indicating that such expenses include "post appointment obligations incurred 
2 Birchler (1997) provides a contract-theoretic explanation of the priority structure of bank deposits. 
3  At the time national depositor was enacted 29 states had similar laws covering state-chartered banks 
and 18 had depositor preference statutes covering state-chartered thrift institutions. 
3 by the receiver as part of  the liquidation of an institution." and that "this  priority also 
covers certain expenses incurred prior to the appointment of  the receiver." 4  In other 
words, the receiver (which for  most banks and thrifts is the FDIC) may pay expenses it 
deems to be consistent with the orderly closure of  the institution, even if those expenses 
were incurred prior to the depository's closure. These pre-receivership expenses include. 
the payment of the institution's last payroll, guard services, data processing &ices, 
utilities aitd lease payments. Examples of expenses that would be excluded are items  . 
such as golden parachute claims, severance pay claims, and liabilities arising from the 
repudiation of  contracts. 
11. Related Literature 
The purported impact of  DPL is to decrease the FDIC's costs of  resolving bank 
failures. Such costs derive from three sources. First are the losses that reflect the 
underlying insolvency of  the bank. These are the realization of  the downside risk 
associated with a bank's investment and financing decisions. On an economist's 
extended balance sheet, these losses equal the negative market net worth of  the firm 
(excluding the value of  government guarantees). Second are the losses related to 
forbearance, which are incurred after the depository is no longer economically viable 
but before it is closed. 5,6  Third are the costs associated with receivership, including 
administrative and legal  expense^.^ 
Several adverse impacts of  DPL have been hypothesized. The most frequent has 
been increased collateralization by nondepositors or general creditors which include 
4 See Federal Register (1993). At the time of  this writing the FDIC had not issued a final rule on depositor 
preference. 
Although the costs of  forbearance have not been explicitly calculated for banks, DeGennaro and Thornson 
(1996) find that these costs were considerable for thrifts. 
6 Kane (1986) argues that information, funding, administrative  and legal, and political constraints cause 
bank regulators to adopt suboptimal closure rules. Allen and Saunders (1993) model deposit insurance as a 
callable perpetual put option. The value of  forbearance is the difference between the value of  the call option 
under unconstrained regulatory closure rules and its value under constrained closure rules. 
For example, expenses for the FDIC's division of  liquidation averaged 8.3 percent of  collections in 1991 
(see the FDIC's 1991  Annual Report). Moreover, at the end of  1992, the FDIC's estimated contingent include trade creditors, beneficiaries  of guarantees, foreign depositors (to the extent that 
their treatment is different from that of domestic depositors), holders of  bankers 
acceptances, unsecured lenders, landlords, fed funds sellers, and counterparties to 
various contingent liabilities. Collateralization would move such secured lenders ahead 
of  all depositors in terms of the priority of claims in the event of  failure. While 
collateralization would have this impact even without depositor preference Hirschhorn 
and &NOS  (1990) claim that the new legislation increases the incentive to collateralize. 
They further conclude that the damage done by DPL to the insurer and the uninsured 
depositor increases with the degree of  collateralization of  nondeposit claims and the 
extent of  insolvency. 
It has also been claimed that depositor preference would harm smaller 
community banks and thrifts. Banks  with lower levels of  capital supposedly would 
have a harder time floating debt, borrowing federal funds, leasing computers, and 
renting space. Some banks might be shut out of  the derivatives markets or see their 
credit rating on bankers' acceptance or bank notes downgraded? Large banks and, in 
particular, those seen as too-big-to-let fail supposedly would have an enhanced 
advantage in attracting deposits over $100,000 since such deposits may not be seen as 
being at risk, though the risk would increase for smaller banks with depositor 
preference. Claims have also been made of a negative impact on market discipline 
though others claim a positive impact due to the increased risk of  loss among 
n~nde~ositors.~ 
There has been little empirical research on the impact of  depositor preference 
legislation (DPL), despite repeated claims of benefits. Hirschhorn and &NOS  (1990) 
found that, following the passage of  state DPL, general creditors of  affected savings and 
loans increased collateralization and interest rates on uninsured certificates of  deposits 
Liability for unresolved legal cases was $404 million. Costs of receivership also include losses that arise 
from the inefficient asset salvage operation of  the receiver (see Kane [1990]). 
See Rehm (1993) 
9 See Kaufman (1997). 
5 fell. While Osterberg (1996) finds evidence that resolution costs for commercial banks 
closed in states with DPL were lower than in other states, the exact role played by DPL 
is unclear. In studies which provide no role for DPL, Bovenzi and Murton (1988), James 
(1991), and OT model resolution costs as determined by problem assets,-risky  assets, 
and core deposits. OT also include proxies for fraud and off-balance sheet risk. Below 
we will attempt to tike into account empirical findings on the determinants of  - 
resolution costs and to discern the mechanism through which DPL might play an 
additional role. 
111.  Data and Empirical Methods 
Since the preponderance of  bank failures occurred prior to 1993, we choose to 
analyze the impact of  state-level DPLs already in effect. It is notable that state-level 
DPLs apply to state-chartered institutions which differ along several dimensions from 
national banks (see Osterberg [1996]).  A list of  the state depositor preference laws for 
banks and thrifts can be found the appendix. 
The sample includes all operating FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks on 
December 31,1992 and those FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks that were closed or 
required FDIC financial assistance to remain open from January 1,1986 through 
December 31,1992. Quarterly balance sheet and income data for these banks are from 
the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council's Quarterly Reports of  Condition 
and Income (call reports) from March 31,1984 through December 31,1992. Closure 
data, estimated resolution cost (to the FDIC) and  resolution type are from FDIC (1993). 
We address three econometric problems with previous studies of  closed-bank 
resolution costs. The first is that these studies usually fail to control for the endogeneity 
of  book capital [see (Maddala (1986) and Thomson (1992)l. The second is that estimates 
of a single equation model of  closed-bank resolution costs suffer from sample selection 
bias induced by regulatory closure rules [see Barth et al. (1990)l.  Finally, these studies 
fail to control for the endogeneity of the choice of resolution type. In the estimation of our empirical model we will econometrically correct for these effects. 
Our empirical model focuses on two equations that are estimated sequentially. 
In equation (1) the dependent variable equals 0  when failure is resolved by 
liquidation, which provides no de facto deposit guarantees to uninsured depositors and 
general creditors and equals 1  otherwise. Prior to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of  1991 the FDIC could resolve bank 
insolvencies in one of  three ways. First, the FDIC could choose to liquidate the 
institution, in what is commonly referred to a payout. While there are several different 
ways to implement a payout the implications for the FDIC, uninsured depositors, and 
unsecured general creditors are the same for each; they receive no de facto guarantees 
of  their claims and thus are fully exposed to loss. The second way in which the FDIC 
could resolve an insolvency is through a purchase and assumption transaction (P&A). 
Prior to FDICIA, a P&A typically involved the transfer of  all deposits and general 
creditor obligations to another bank, thereby providing de facto guarantees to senior 
creditors. The krd  method has the FDIC infusing capital into an open institution. The 
net effect of  such open-bank assistance (OBA) is the extension of  de facto deposit 
insurance coverage to depositors and general creditors.10 
The key to understanding how and why DPL might influence the FDIC's choice 
of  resolution type is an outline of  the way in which DPL would affect the outcomes to 
10  The Competitive Equality Banking Act of  1987 gave the FDIC an intermediate option for handling a 
failed bank, the bridge bank. Under bridge bank authority (which was expanded by FIRREA 1989) the 
FDIC can pass the assets and liabilities of  the failing bank into a specially chartered National bank which 
the FDIC can operate for up to three years. The bridge bank option gives the FDIC more flexibility in 
resolving closed banks by extending the time it has to weigh its alternative resolution options. 
7 various creditor claims under different types of  resolutions. As was noted by 
Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990), under liquidation and without depositor preference, the 
FDIC will share with both the uninsured depositors and nondepositors. In an  assisted 
merger, on the other hand, all deposits are covered even without depositor preference 
and the nondeposit claims are passed on to the acquiring institution. However, with 
depositor preference the nondeposit claims may not be passed on. 
From this analysis, Hirschhorn and Zervos conclude that the only case where 
depositor preference will unambiguously benefit the FDIC is in an assisted merger (e-g. 
P&A), suggesting a positive relationship between DPL and the use of  P&As. Other 
authors reach different conclusions. Ely (1993), for example, argues that depositor 
preference would reduce the usage of  the 'purchase and assumption' resolution method 
in which all assets and liabilities are transferred to the new owner. He thus predicts the 
increased usage of deposit transfers in which only deposits were transferred. 
For the estimation of  the resolution type equation, we group the OBA banks and 
the P&A banks into a single category and estimate equation (1)  using probit. 
11 12 
Variable definitions are given in Table 2 and the top panel of  Table 6 lists the variables 
included in the resolution type equation. These variables were chosen by stepwise 
regression with the order shown in the top panel of  Table 3 being the order in which the 
variables were chosen.  l3 
The coefficient on our dummy variable for depositor preference status will be 
negative (positive) if  state banks in states with DPL are more likely to be resolved via 
liquidation (P&A or OBA). The discussion above also implies that higher levels of 
COREDEP (and thus lower levels of  nondeposit claims) would encourage the use of 
l1 Application of  multinomial probit to (1) is  infeasible due to the small number of  OBA  transactions in 
our sample. In  addition, since the OBA and P&A have the same implications for senior creditors the 
choice between them should not be affected by the presence of  depositor preference laws. 
lZ The failure equation probit provides the selectivity condition for the resolution type probit. 
l3 A theory of  how resolution type is chosen would have at least narrowed the list of  variables. However, 
another important consideration is that the right-hand side variables for the two equations permit 
identification. 
8 P&As and OBA.  Keeley (1990) claims that COREDEP controls for the franchise (charter) 
value and is a source of  unbooked gains. Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) argue that the 
FDIC  will try to mimirnize its losses by closing banks in a manner that preserves the 
value of  the charter. We include as an explanatory variable the predicted value of net 
worth/total assets generated as described below. 
Equation12) is the resolution cost equation. Since little case-specific data on 
receivership costs is available, let alone the marginal receivership cost for each closed 
institution, we measure the dependent variable as the total resolution cost. The list of 
independent variables extends that in OT.  We estimate (2) by weighted-least squares 
and, as is the case for all the equations, regressors are dated 4 to 6 months before the 
closure date. 
RESCOST is the FDIC's estimated resolution cost as published by the FDIC (1993, 
Appendix A). OREO, PD30, and PDNA are proxy variables for asset quality. Given that 
the primary sources of unbooked losses are losses on the asset portfolio, on-book 
problem assets should be a good proxy for these unbooked losses. As discussed above, 
COREDEP controls for the franchise value and is a source of  unbooked gains. UNCOL 
is a proxy for problem assets not reported by the bank. As Bovenzi and Murton (1988) 
note, distressed banks have incentives to cover up the amount of problem assets in their 
portfolio. One method for doing this is to book income on a nonperforming loan to 
prevent it from being classified as past due or nonaccrual. This implies that UNCOL 
would be positively correlated with unbooked losses. Book equity plus reserves, 
CAPPRED, represent the cushion between the value of  assets and the promised 
payments to debt holders. NCRASST is included as a proxy for portfolio risk. 
OT included dummy variables for filer types (filer type is related to size) and size 
categories defined by the dummies DSZ1-DSZ6. We replace these categories by 
LNASST, a decision supported by a standard specification test, and add variables capturing regional variation in banking  condition^.'^ 
Predicted resolution type is also included: if the FDIC  minimizes resolution cost 
(subject to various legal and regulatory constraints) through its choice of  resolution 
type, DPL'S  impact on resolution cost may be partly absorbed through the inclusion of 
predicted resolution type in the resolution cost equation. We also include a predicted 
level of  net worth. Predicted values for both resolution type and the level of  net worth 
are included to control for their endogeneity. The standard errors are adjusted as 
described below. 
Although (1) and (2) are the main equations of  interest, we first estimate two 
other equations and assume that the model has a recursive structure. The first is for net 
worth with book capital being predicted by bank balance sheet variables. The second 
equation is a probit for failure (bank  closure). As in Barth, Bartholomew, and Bradley 
(1990) we construct an instrument to control for sampleselection bias in the resolution- 
type and resolution-cost equations. Following Thomson [I9921 the predicted value of 
book capital from the net worth equation is included as a proxy for net worth on the 
right-hand side of the closure, resolution-type, and resolution-cost equations. 
The inclusion of  the predicted value of  net worth on the right-hand side of  the 
other three equations and the inclusion of  a predicted value of  resolution type on the 
right-hand side of  the resolution cost equation requires that the standard errors be 
adjusted, following Murphy and Tope1 (1985). The implementation of this procedure is 
discussed in the appendix. The four equations are estimated using LIMDEP 6.0. First 
the net worth equation is estimated in both ratio and levels form. Then the failure and 
resolution type equations are estimated as an ordered probit (the failure equation 
provides the selection rule for resolution type) including predicted values of  the net 
14 In addition, the sigrhcance of  individual filer type dummies is eliminated when  federal funds 
variables are included. 
10 worth ratio on the right-hand sides.''  Finally, the resolution cost equation is estimated 
with weighted-least squares (dividing by the square root of  total assets), including the 
predicted level of net worth and the predicted resolution type on the right-hand side, 
with the failure equation providing a selection rule. 
V. Results 
- 
Tables 3,4, and 5 present the results for the net worth equations and the closure 
equation, respectively. The interested reader is referred to Thornson (1992) for an 
interpretation of the coefficients of  these equations. 
Table 6 contains the estimated coefficients for equation (1) (resolution type) from 
the ordered probit. The negative and sigruficant coefficient on LPRBSAD indicates that 
the FDIC is more likely to liquidate a closed bank when the value of banking franchises 
are low.  The negative and sigruficant coefficient on the northeast dummy, DUMNES, is 
consistent with the this explanation. 
The relationship between the southwest dummy variable and resolution type is 
more complex. Prohibition of  branching in Texas lead to the creation of large multi- 
bank holding companies (BHCs). The collapse of  the depository institutions sector in 
the Southwest included FDIC resolution of  five of  the eight largest Texas BHCs and the 
death-bed acquisition of  two of  the other three large Texas BHCs by out-of-state 
banking organizations. Finally, despite the economic problems in Southwest in the 
mid-1980s this region was expected to be a high growth region in terms of  both 
population and income. Hence, the positive and significant sign on DUMSW appears to 
be controlling for constraints faced by the FDIC in resolving the insolvency of  large 
multi-bank BHCs and the value of Texas banking franchises to out-of-state BHCs. 
DSBRNCH, the dummy variable for branching regulations, is negative and 
significant. Given that the number of potential acquirers for a closed bank is higher in 
15 Although the failure and resolution type equations together constitute an ordered probit (with neither 
dependent duwy  variable appearing on the right-hand side of the other equation), L1MDEF"s bivariate 
probit routine could be  utilized. 
11 states without intrastate branching restrictions we would expect DSBRNCH be 
positively related to the use of the purchase and assumption resolution option (and 
other types of  assisted mergers). 
Thomson (1992) finds that the probability a bank is closed is inversely related to 
its capitalization. This suggests that closed banks with high book capital ratios are  , 
,  ,  likely to have high levels of unbooked losses.16 Another important source of unbooked 
losses on a bank's balance sheet is other real estate owned, which is essentially 
repossessed properties. Hence, the negative and significant coefficients on CAPTAPS 
and OREOAS are consistent with the FDIC's choice of  a liquidation when faced with 
large contingent liabilities. 
The positive and sigruficant coefficients on LNASST and CORDEPA are 
consistent with expectations. A positive and sigruficant relationship between size and 
de facto insurance of  all senior claimants (uninsured depositors and general creditors) is 
consistent with the too-big-to-let fail doctrine practiced prior to FDICIA (see Camel1 
[I9931 and Todd and Thomson [1991]). The positive and sigruficant coefficient on 
CORDEPA is consistent with the model of  Buser et al. (1981). 
The results from equation (1)  suggest that DPL induces the FDIC to choose 
P&As. There are two possible explanations for the positive coefficient on DPL. First, 
general creditors in banks subject to depositor preference might successfully exit the 
bank or effectively collateralize their exposure before the bank is closed, thereby raising 
the cost of  a liquidation vis-i-vis purchase and assumption and open-bank assistance 
transactions. Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990) provide evidence of this type of general 
creditor response in their study of  thrifts. Second, as in Kane (1986), constraints faced 
by the FDIC may cause it to choose the resolution option that jointly minimizes its 
fiduciary, political, and other costs associated with resolving the closed bank.  In a 
liquidation the FDIC would have to strictly observe depositor preference, whereas, in 
16 This effect may be partially absorbed by taking account of the selection rule provided by the closure 
equation. 
12 P&A and OBA it could choose to ignore it.  Hence, DPL  could increase the non- 
fiduciary costs to the FDIC associated with liquidations, increasing the relative 
attractiveness the its alternative failed-bank resolution options. 
Estimated coefficients for equation (2) from the selection model appear in table 7 
and 8.. Table 9 compares these results with those found in OT and Osterberg (1996) and 
thus indicates the importance of  correcting for sample selection bias induced by 
regulatory closure rules. Estimated coefficients on the proxy variables for unbooked 
losses and gains in closed bank portfolios are larger (in absolute value) than those in 
previous studies, and in many cases the differences are statistically sigxuficant. 
The coefficient on our instrument for book capital, CAPPRED, is negative and 
sigruficantly different from both zero and (-1).  This corroborates the findings of  James 
(1991) and OT of  sigruficant unbooked losses on the balance sheets of  failed banks. On 
the other hand, unlike James (1991) and OT, income earned but not received, UNCOL, 
was not signhcant at the 10 percent level although the sign of its impact was positive. 
However, the coefficient on UNCOL is positive and sigruficant in when equation (2) 
omits measures of  fed funds sold, fed funds purchased and other borrowed money as 
regressors. 
PDNA and ORE0 are included in equation (2) as proxies for asset quality. Both 
of  these control for unbooked losses and have positive and significant coefficients. As 
in OT we find loans to insiders and portfolio risk to be positively and significantly 
related to resolution costs. Moreover, as in Osterberg (1996) we find that a positive and 
significant coefficient on FFSOLD.  This is consistent with banks in depressed regional 
economies using fed funds as the residual asset item in managing the asset side of  their 
balance sheet. Hence, FFSOLD may be proxying for the quality of  the loan portfolio. 
Off-balance sheet activities are negatively and significantly related to resolution 
costs. Similar results are found by OT when OBS is split into off-balance sheet loan 
items and other off-balance sheet activities. A negative and significant coefficient on OBS is consistent with the market discipline hypothesisof Boot and Thakor (1991) and 
the hypothesis that banks use derivative contracts to hedge against on-balance-sheet 
risk." 
In Table 8, as in OT, bank size remains an important determinant of  resolution 
costs. The positive and sigruficant coefficient on WASST is consistent with higher 
FDIC administratiw and legal expenses for resolving large banks.  The results are 
qualitativily the same found when dummy variables are used to proxy for size. 
Resolution type does not have a significant impact on resolution cost. The 
coefficients on predicted resolution type from equation (1) (PRESTYPE), and its product 
with COREDEP, (ICORE23), are statistically insigruficant.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the FDIC chooses resolution type to minimize resolution cost. 
The positive and sigruficant coefficient on the depositor preference dummy in the 
resolution cost equation is inconsistent with the hypothesis that depositor preference 
laws lower the FDIC's costs. However, we cannot distinguish the source of the higher 
resolution costs. The positive coefficient on DPL is consistent with either the FDIC 
adopting resolution options that provided de facto guarantees of  all senior creditors 
found in equation (1) or with offsetting responses by general creditors. Which of  these 
explanations holds has important implications for the efficacy of  the national depositor 
preference laws. If  higher resolution costs associated with DPL are driven by FDIC 
behavior then reforms in FDICU (1991), such as prompt corrective action and the 
constraints on too-big-to-let fail, could eliminate or reverse this effect of DPL.  If, on the 
other hand, general creditor behavior is driving the positive coefficient on DPL then the 
net effect of the national depositor preference may be to increase FDIC closed-bank 
resolution costs. 
FFPURCH and OBM are included in equation (2) as proxies for general creditor 
claims. Ceteris paribus, higher levels of FFPURCH, as unfunded liabilities, would be 
l7 See Avery and Berger (1991) and Koppenhaver and Stover (1991). 
14 expected to increase costs. However, the negative and significant coefficient on 
FFPURCH and the negative coefficient on OBM are not consistent with general 
creditors increasing their collateralization. FFPURCH includes repurchase agreements 
whicli are collateralized so that we might have expected the average collateralization of 
this category to rise. One alternative explanation is similar to that suggested by the 
coefficient on OBS, namely that F~PURCH  and OBM provide market discipline and that 
banks able to utilize these funding channels have lower unbooked losses than we have 
captured with our call report proxies for balance sheet quality. 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
An examination of  the period preceding the passage of the national depositor 
preference law provides no evidence to support claims that depositor preference will 
result in lower FDIC resolution costs. On the contrary, we find a positive relationship 
between depositor preference and the cost of  resolving a closed bank. We also find a 
positive relationship between the presence of  depositor preference laws and the use of 
P&A and OBA transactions, both of  which minimize the benefit to the FDIC from 
depositor preference. These results are largely consistent with Kane's (1986) analysis of 
FDIC behavior. 
The sample period we study precedes the implementation of  FDICIA (1991) 
which placed limits on the FDIC's ability to extend de facto guarantees to uninsured 
depositors and general creditors.18  As a result, the FDIC's choice of  resolution type 
may no longer be affected by depositor preference laws. On the one hand, this 
provision of  FDICIA may induce general creditors to increase collateralization or 
shorten maturities. On the other hand, if  FDICIA's prompt corrective action provisions 
result in the closure of  capital deficient but book solvent banks, then depositor 
preference should have no impact on FDIC resolution costs. 
18 See Camell (1993)  for a  discussion of FDICIA. 
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:  Legislation became effective on either January 1  or July 1. 
2: Passed by both houses on July 1, enactment date unclear. 
In other cases when only the year is indicated, neither the month nor the day of 






















Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Yearly total bank failure liabilities by state @un and Bradstreet) 
Brokered deposits 
Predicted level of  net-worth from net worth equation 
Scaled version of predicted net worth/total asset 
Core deposits - domestic deposits under $10,000 
Core deposits/Total Assets 
= 1  if bank is in a bank-holding company (=0 otherwise) 
= 1  if  state bank in a state with depositor preference legislation 
= 1  if bank's home state has statewide branching (=0 otherwise) 
if bank is in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia Fed districts 
=I if bank is in the Dallas Fed district 
.Annualized  non-interest expense/Total Assets 
Federal Fund sold (lent) 
Federal Funds purchased (borrowed) 
Foreign deposits + FFPURCH + OBM + BRKDEP 
Predicted ESTYPE* Core Deposits 
Interest income earned on loans that is uncollected 
Loans to insiders 
Net worth lagged one call report 
LCAP/Total Assets 
Mills' ratio from failure equation (selectivity correction) 























Scaled version of  LIQL 
Natural logarithm of  total assets 
Natural logarithm of  BFLLQB 
Scaled version of  LNBFLIAB 
Loan Herfindahl index (see Thornson [1992]) 
Logarithm of  commercial problem bank assets (quarterly, scaled) 
Risky assets not in OREO, PDNA, or INSLNS/Total Assets 
Charge-offs minus recoveries (annualized)/Total Assets 
Level of  Charge-offs minus recoveries (annualized) 
Annualized net income 
Other borrowed money 
Off-balance sheet items 
Off-balance sheet loans 
Off-balance sheet items other than loans 
Off-balance sheet items/Total Assets 
Other real estate owned 
OREO/Total Assets 
OREOAS scaled 
Per capital income (by state, yearly) 
Scaled PC1 
Loans 90 days past-due or non-accruing 
PDNA/Total assets 
1  for purchase and assumptions or open bank assistance 
= 0 for Payouts, (Deposit Transfers; Liquidations) Table 4: OLS Estimation of  Net Worth Equation 
Ordinary  least squares regression. 
Observations  =  12554 
Mean of  LHS  =  0.2574261E+05 
StdDev of  residuals=  0.9529209E+04 
R-squared  -  -  0.9983717E+OO 
F[ 14,125391  = : 0.5491533E+06 
Log-likelihood  =  -0.1328271E+06 
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= 0.9091432E+08  . 
ANOVA  Source  Variation 
Regression  0.6981284E+15 
Residual  0.1138614E+13 
Total  0.6992671E+15 
Durbin-Watson stat.=  1.9899685 
Dep. Variable  =  CAP 
Weights  .  -  -  ONE 
Std.Dev of LHS.  =  0.2360194E+06 
Sum of squares  =  0.1138614E+13 
Adjusted R-sq.  =  0.9983699E+00  . 
Prob value  =  0.3217295E-13 
Restr.(b=O) Log-1  = . -0.1731268E+06 
Akaike 1nfo.Crit.  =  0.2116331E+02 
Degrees of Freedom  Mean Square 
14.  0.4986632E+14 
12539.  0.9080583E+08 
12553.  0.5570517E+11 
Autocorrelation  =  0.0050158 















PC1 Table 5: Probit Estimation of  Failure/Closure Equation for Selection 
in Resolution Cost Equation 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Log-Likelihood ..............  -897.79 
Restricted (Slopes=O) Log-L.  '4047.1 
Chi-Squared(12)  ............  6298.7 
Sigruhcance Level ..........  0.32173E-13 
N(0,l) used for sigruficance levels. 















Frequencies of  actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability. 
Predicted 
Actual  0  1  TOTAL 
Total  11450  1104  12554 Table 8: Estimation of  Resolution Cost Equation with Selection 
Equation Based on Failure/Closure 
Two stage  least squares regression.  Dep. Variable  = RESCOST 
Observations  =  1240  Weights  = ISQRTASS 
Mean of  LHS  =  0.7785666E+04  Std.Dev of  LHS  = 0.3580882E+05 
StdDev of  residuals= 0.2826802E+05  Sum  of squares  = 0.9764769E+12 
R-squared  =  0.3763211E+00  Adjusted-  R-squared= 0.3676447E+00 
F[17, 12221  =  -  0.4337303E+02  Prob value  = 0.3217295E-13 
Log-likelihood  =  -0.1445978E+05  Restr.(b=O) Log-1 = -0.1476156E+05 
Amemiya Pr. Criter.= 0.8106805E+09  Akaike 1nfo.Crit. = 0.2335126E+02 
Standard error corrected for selection .....  28274. 
Correlation of disturbance in regression 
and Selection Criterion (Rho)  ...... .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 0.41 150E-01 
N(0,l) used for significance levels. 


















LAMBDA Table 9: The Impact of  Depositor Preference Legislation on Resolution Costs 
Osterberg (1996)  Selection Model 



























Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Observations are weighted by one divided by the square root of  total assets. 
The first column is from the Table 3, Osterberg and Thomson (1995). The second column 
is unreported, referenced in from Osterberg (1996). 
* :  significant at the 10% level. 
**: significant at the 5% level. 
Results in third column use predicted capital and resolution type. Appendix A 
Adjustment of Standard Errors for hclusion of  Predicted Values as Regressors 
We  follow Murphy and Tope1 (1985) in deriving the correct standard errors 
when one or more variables on the right-hand side of  either the failure/closure, 
resolution type, or resolution cost equation has been generated by a prior estimation. In 
the case of  the failure/closure equation, and the resolution type equation, which are 
estimated by probit (maximum likelihood [MLE]), the right-hand side includes the  * 
predicted value of  net worth/total assets, which was generated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In the case of  resolution cost, the right-hand side includes the predicted 
level of  net worth, estimated by OLS, and the predicted resolution type, predicted by 
probit (MLE). 
Murphy and Tope1 present the correct adjustment when the first stage estimation 
is maximum likelihood and the second MLE or when both are MLE. Here we detail the 
derivation for the slightly different case when the first stage is OLS and the second 
MLE. 
The OLS estimation yields: 
&(S,  -8;) = (+ Xi X,  )-I  t  X;U,  ,  where X,  U, and 8 denote the right-hand side variables, 
estimated residuals, and parameters, respectively. 
The MLE  estimation yields: 
where l2  denotes the log-likelihood for the second equation, 8, denotes the parameters 
in the second equation (including those associated with the predicted values from prior 
equations). 
Substitution yields: 
where R, is Fisher's information matrix which can be written as -  ] and will be easily retrieved from the estimation of  the second  ae2ae; 
equation.'  4 must be derived and is equal to -E {:;el} 
Then we need the form of the variance-covariance matrix a where 
Then, for the estimated parameters for the second equation (8, ) we have 
~(6,  -  8;) -  N(0, Z)  where 
Z  = R;'  +  R;' [R;  c2  (x;  X, )-I  nR3 + Q;  ($4 +  R; Q-I  Q,]R;'  where Rz  and h  are defined as 
1 
above, Qr  is the lower-left hand quadrant of  a,  and & = -  (x~x,  1'.  which is easily 
n 
retrievable from the results of  the first-stage OLS estimation. 
For the standard error adjustment for both the failure and resolution type 
equations, the log-likelihood is based on the bivariate probit as discussed by Greene 
(1993). As mentioned in the text, since neither the failure dummy nor the resolution 
type dummy appears in the other's equation, while the failure equation supplies the 
selection rule for the resolution type equation, the two are better thought of  as an 
ordered probit. However, although there is no simultaneity the presence of  selectivity 
implies that p # 0. 
1 Given that the failure/dosure  and resolution type equations are estimated as an ordered probit, R is 
retrieved as the appropriate quadrant of  the variance covariance matrix from the two equations 
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